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Till Time’s Last Sand: 
A History of the Bank of England, 1694-2013 
By David Kynaston 
 
 
Amongst the reasons why historical accounts of major Central Banks, and of leading Central Bankers, 
are so enduringly fascinating to many of us is that they stand at the cross-roads, the hinge, between 
the public and private sectors, between art and science, between politics and finance, between 
human judgment and quantitative analysis.  Thus the Bank of England is now independent within the 
public sector and the half-way house between Whitehall and the City. 
 
In this beautifully written and highly entertaining book, Kynaston focusses on the personal, political, 
cultural and social aspects of the Bank, rather than on its quantitative, numerical and theoretical 
features.  He is absolutely justified in doing so, since the economic historians of the Bank, Clapham, 
Sayers, Fforde, Capie and now Harold James, have already had their opportunities to provide plenty 
of numerical analysis, (not that some of them did enough).  So Kynaston’s remit was clearly to put a 
more human face on the Bank. 
 
He does so extremely well.  Besides the many lucid Chapters on the roles, views, activities and 
judgments on the leading players in the Bank, Governors, Deputy-Governors, members of Court, 
Executive Directors, etc., there is in each of the four main Parts, (covering 1694-1815, 1815-1914, 
1914-1946, 1946-1997, plus a post-script 1997-2013), a Chapter on what it was like to work as an 
ordinary employee in the Bank, Chapters 3, 7, 11 and 16; as befits a social historian, who has written 
several earlier books on what it has been like to live in Britain.   
 
But Kynaston here is determinedly non-quantitative; as far from cliometric as one can get.  While 
there are plenty of individual numbers in the text, there is not a single Chart, Graph or Table to 
interrupt the mellifluous flow of the text, let alone something as far out as equations or regressions.  
Instead, there are photographs of people, mostly Governors, and Bank buildings.  In my view this is a 
pity.  It would have helped to get a more continuous view of the scale of the Bank relative to GDP 
and/or the broader money supply, and of interest rates and the National Debt, etc. 
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Kynaston’s main modus operandi is to allow his historical characters to speak for themselves about 
what they were thinking and doing by unearthing, and then reproducing, apposite quotations, and 
then weaving a collection of such quotations, often lengthy, into a coherent and continuous story.  
He is a complete master of such a technique and deploys it with great skill.  Of course, all the famous 
quotes are here and in their proper context, e.g. Norman to Clay, “you are not here to tell us what to 
do, but to explain to us why we have done it”, p. 358; Keynes about Montagu Norman, “always 
absolutely charming, always absolutely wrong”, p. 383; “the Bank is a bank and not a study group”, 
p. 416; etc., etc.  His scrap-book collection of potential quotations, used and unused, before he got 
down to writing it all up, must have been huge. 
 
Both author and publisher deserve much credit for an excellently produced and presented book.  In 
the 800, or so, pages of text, I found nary a typo, and it was all beautifully written.  As far as I could 
tell, all the quotes were accurate and the facts almost all correct.  Of course, in such a lengthy book 
there must be a few slips.  For example, p. 437, Sayers is described as an ‘historian’; he was that too, 
but he was primarily a monetary economist and a Professor of Economics at LSE; p. 514, where I am 
reported to be a “convinced monetarist”, (though Kynaston quotes me correctly on more other 
occasions than I deserve); p. 753, where Kynaston suggests that Northern Rock had “all its 
excellence on the lending side”, including its ‘Together’ mortgage loans with an LTV ratio of 120%?  
But these are occasional exceptions to the rule that one can trust Kynaston’s general accuracy.   
 
So, who should read this book, and in what way?  I would not advise anyone, except perhaps for 
other reviewers and bank historians, to start reading on page 1 and go on steadily through to page 
796.  This book is probably best read back to front.  Most of us are primarily interested in more 
recent history.  So start with the final postscript, pp 729-796, and then work backwards, Chapter by 
Chapter, as far as your inclination and interests take you.  Of course, if someone has a research 
interest in the role of the Bank in an earlier period, then Kynaston’s book will form an excellent 
introduction before embarking on a deeper study.  In his history of 319 years in 796 pages, he 
cannot go very deeply into each subject; indeed it is remarkable how much he does manage to pack 
into these pages. 
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Trying to let the main actors tell their own stories via apposite quotations tends to imply a non-
judgmental approach, and that seems to me what Kynaston is attempting.  Perhaps the main 
recurring theme is the balance between moral hazard and the prevention of contagious financial 
instability, which crops up repeatedly, e.g. in Overend Gurney, Barings 1 and 2, the Fringe or 
Secondary Bank Crisis, the LDC crisis, Northern Rock, and several others.  On the whole Kynaston 
seems to side with those who believe that ‘moral hazard fundamentalism’, as Geithner called it, 
should be abandoned once a crisis seems imminent, i.e. that Bagehot should be preferred to 
Hankey; but he is keen to give space and understanding to the counter-arguments.   
 
Kynaston is much less good on the other continuing monetary debates, on the currency versus the 
banking school, on rules versus discretion, on whether credit and money creation should be 
combined or separated, etc.  For example, there was no mention of the ‘real bills doctrine’.  Perhaps 
he can be excused on the grounds that these latter issues lay within the separate domain of 
economic theory, better left to the economists. 
 
Where he was very good was in describing relationships between Whitehall and the Bank; his 
exposure of the tendency of the Bank to blame economic failures on fiscal policy, especially 
excessive public expenditures, and of Whitehall to blame monetary policy, especially weak-kneed 
credit control, is exactly right. 
 
No doubt as befits a social historian, Kynaston puts great weight on cultural issues, and the portrait 
that comes of the Bank (recent years partially excepted) is rather critical, i.e. hierarchical, class 
conscious, conservative, somewhat exclusive, cult of the general amateur, uncommunicative (at 
least prior to the Radcliffe Committee Report 1959), etc.  No doubt there is much validity in all this, 
but Kynaston misses one partial explanation.  Ever since the Bank became subservient to the 
Chancellor in the conduct of monetary policy, i.e. 1931-1997, the Chancellor was almost certainly 
bound to listen more to the specialist economists in HMT than to their counterparts in the Bank.  So, 
if the Bank was to influence policy, it would be by emphasizing their ‘feel’ for markets.  In the 1970s, 
and subsequently up till the 1990s, the Bank had the expertise to publish forecasts.  But when they 
sought to do so they were rebuffed and prevented by HMT, who argued that commentators would 
just focus on the differences between the two sets of forecasts.  Since 1997, of course, the boot has 
been on the other foot! 
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Overall this is an, intentionally, very different kind of history from that already written by the 
economic historians.  But with its focus on people and cultural issues it provides a useful, 
entertaining and beautifully written complement.  And the non-judgmental tying together of 
relevant quotations, allowing all the main protagonists to speak for themselves, is masterfully done. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
